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Alzheimer’s Disease 
Metaphors as Mirror and 
Lens to the Stigma of 
Dementia
Martina Zimmermann
[M]etaphors may be as necessary to illness as they are to literature, 
as comforting to the patient as his own bathrobe and slippers. At 
the very least, they are a relief from medical terminology. If laughter 
has healing power, so, too, may metaphor. Perhaps only metaphor 
can express the bafflement, the panic combined with beatitude, of 
the threatened person.
—Anatole Broyard, Intoxicated by My Illness1
In an attempt to create meaning during the autobiographical 
disruption experienced in illness, patients run to the healing powers 
of telling their story. The act of assigning meaning to specific events 
in an illness process has been shown to have healing effects.2 In par-
ticular, metaphors “enable people to recreate a sense of continuity, . . . 
[providing] a transforming bridge between the image of the old life 
and the new one.”3
The present work is concerned with the additional complication 
posed by the narration of a disease defined by cognitive decline. This 
is of particular interest since writing is always also a process of making 
memory and, thus, creating and maintaining the self: how do individu-
als with impaired memory preserve their identity?4 Self-preservation 
in this scenario must also confront culturally dominant images of 
dependence, decline, and passivity. But just as the act of writing per 
se is a statement against such images, Alzheimer’s patients’ telling be-
comes a platform for the creation of a dementia counter-discourse that 
emphasizes their continued agency.5 I specifically want to understand 
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how patients define themselves in and through their narratives’ form, 
content, and metaphors.
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of dementia among 
the elderly in the developed world; it is a progressive, degenerative, 
and irreversible condition that has become a synecdoche for all kinds 
of dementia. Yet, its pathogenesis remains elusive despite much inten-
sive research.6 Patients receive the diagnosis of a cognitive disorder 
of terminal character, for which pharmacological treatments have only 
limited ability to control symptoms. The brain areas particularly affected 
are the hippocampus and cerebral cortex, which together harbor our 
ability to memorize and abstractly reason. Symptoms are largely of 
neuropsychological character: the loss of memory, the impaired ability 
to understand or produce speech, and the inability to recognize things 
or people. In the early stages of their condition, patients are aware 
that their mental acuity continually declines and their perception of 
the individual they used to be gradually disappears. Patients afflicted 
by the early-onset form of Alzheimer’s disease are as young as forty-
five at the time of their diagnosis and account for approximately two 
percent of patients diagnosed, while the more well-known late-onset 
form is defined as afflicting individuals aged sixty-five years or older. 
Regardless of their age of onset, patients usually have five to ten years 
between diagnosis and death, passing through different stages of the 
condition.7 Early stages still allow for patients’ self-articulation, while 
later stages strongly limit intellectual performance and make them 
dependent on caregivers for everyday tasks. 
Set in the context of the condition’s current medico-scientific 
outlook, this study has two aims. First, I want to give an overview 
of key metaphors that patients and caregivers use to put their ex-
periences with a chronic degenerative, cognitive, and incurable disorder 
into words. Second, I want to analyze how these images mirror their 
views of the condition and, especially, their narration of cognitive 
decline. Some of the images discussed may not be new or unique to 
dementia. However, as they resonate (or not) with the depiction of 
other conditions (I am thinking of diseases like HIV/AIDS before ef-
fective pharmaceutical treatments were developed, terminal cancer, and 
other types of brain damage like stroke), their explanatory potential 
for the dementia patient is further highlighted by current disability 
studies discourse. Especially where patients and caregivers use the 
same metaphor but impose very different meanings on the image, the 
political intent of patients’ writing becomes clear. While single aspects 
of the triad—chronicity, cognitive degeneration, and incurability—are 
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core characteristics of other conditions, their combination makes them 
key to understanding the dementia experience. This approach will help 
us appreciate whether patients and caregivers perceive the condition 
as similar to, or fundamentally different from, other diseases. It will 
also put Alzheimer’s disease further in perspective, as we can better 
understand what it is about the condition that Western society, in 
particular, so fears.
The essay’s first part explores the metaphors patients use to de-
scribe their condition, and analyzes how their narrative strategies fit 
with these images. It also looks at how caregivers depict their patients 
and attempt to narrate their stories. Since patient and caregiver have 
different agendas motivating their writing, I limit myself to looking 
into metaphors that directly refer to the illness itself, not the caring 
experience or other concerns of the caregiver. Comparing the patient’s 
to the caregiver’s telling will highlight the discrepancies between their 
perceptions of the illness and draw attention to the patient’s assertions 
against a reifying discourse that is often found in caregiver stories. 
But metaphors are not only a mode of verbal articulation that mirrors 
the narrator’s perception. They are also, as George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson explain, a concept of thought and action.8 They structure basic 
understandings of our experience, and can influence our actions in 
relation to this experience. Comprehending, for example, the human 
mind as a machine helps to grasp the systematic and methodical 
nature of thought processes; at the same time, this image may lead 
to conceptualizing and potentially treating an individual as “broken 
down” or “dysfunctional” when an illness is perceived to threaten 
that individual’s mind. As such, metaphors can focus, like a lens, on 
the core concerns transported in the images related to the condition.9
My explorations of how patients and caregivers write about the 
condition are followed by a second section analyzing the images, 
metaphors, and concepts they are writing against. This approach will 
pave the way to better understand why they choose specific images 
for their condition in the first place. As I show, caregiver texts tend 
to feature concepts of loss, dependence, and passivity—concepts these 
narrators borrow from the scientific and medical texts from which they 
quote. This medico-scientific discourse reinforces caregiver presentations 
of the disease by supplying references supporting specific claims. But 
this support extends to the level of metaphor as well: caregiver texts 
draw on the metaphors used by scientific researchers, and both con-
tribute to the larger societal conceptualization of dementia. This con-
ceptualization is condensed in society’s use of the term “Alzheimer’s” 
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as a metaphor in its own right for larger biological and social ills. 
The situations and contexts in which this trope appears draw atten-
tion to the biomedical aspects of the condition that are most dreaded 
by society: the Alzheimer’s-as-metaphor zeroes in on the patient’s old 
age, inertia, and passivity, reinforcing exactly those concepts patients 
themselves resist most strongly.
The narratives analyzed here originate from countries on either 
side of the Atlantic and are meant to represent the Western world, 
where, due to changing demographic structures, Alzheimer’s is diag-
nosed with increasing frequency. (While I limit my analysis to Western 
societies, I do not want to suggest that age-related cognitive decline 
does not also challenge more and more Eastern countries.) Publica-
tion dates range from the early 1990s, when first dementia memoirs 
were published, to today. This selection aims to reflect the panoply of 
dementia narratives. Even though most caregiver stories are authored 
by women, I include quotations from John Bayley’s memoirs of his 
wife’s illness.10 His narratives have been widely analyzed, but, to 
my knowledge, never discussed in direct relation to patient accounts. 
In addition, his story presents—as an early and the most prominent 
caregiver account—a point of reference for later caregiver memoirs. 
Andrea Gillies, for example, explicitly writes about the inspiration 
she took from Bayley’s narrative.11 Since the majority of the patients 
who actually publish their stories write with the support of a family 
member or professional writer, I include Diana Friel McGowin’s nar-
rative as one of the earliest patient accounts in the field and Jeanne 
Lee’s story as documents of collaborative life-writing.12 As the only 
available diary I take Claude Couturier’s records from the French 
language, and include Thomas DeBaggio’s piece as the narrative of a 
professional writer and journalist.13 I see these authors as having gained 
a prominence that compares to that of Bayley or Gillies.14 DeBaggio, 
for example, was interviewed on National Public Radio and appeared 
on Oprah Winfrey’s show, while Lee gained popularity as one of the 
founding members of the Dementia Advocacy Support Network.15
I. Dementia Metaphors: Mirroring Patients’ Fears of Alzheimer’s
Counter-Narrating Chronic Degeneration: The Journey of No Return
One metaphor frequently used by both patients and caregivers 
is the image of the “journey.” But patients and caregivers deploy this 
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figure very differently. The title of McGowin’s narrative Living in the 
Labyrinth: A Personal Journey through the Maze of Alzheimer’s combines 
the metaphor of the journey with the image of the labyrinth, con-
veying her sense of a lack of direction and orientation as she faces 
Alzheimer’s disease. She frequently uses the image of the labyrinth 
or maze when describing spatial or temporal disorientation. While 
the subtitle itself suggests that she experiences dementia in terms of 
a journey, her account instead places its emphasis on specific events. 
Individual chapters illustrate various aspects of living with dementia, 
such as “Early Retirement,” “Sexuality,” or “Fears,” rather than a 
chronicle of her descent into memory loss; this structure may be an 
attempt to resist, or even deny, her fear of mental confusion, the fear 
that she would “deteriorate to the point of totally losing myself” (104).
Her choice of presentation helps conceal the increasing disorienta-
tion that would become visible in a chronological account, and which 
would reveal her to be truly locked inside a labyrinth. This is espe-
cially relevant since she claims already in the “Introduction” that: “The 
Alzheimer’s patient asks nothing more than a hand to hold, a heart 
to care, and a mind to think for them when they cannot; someone to 
protect them as they travel through the dangerous twists and turns 
of the labyrinth” (viii). Indeed, support in composing this eloquent 
narrative comes from McGowin’s husband, whose contribution is only 
revealed in the narrative’s epilogue. As also observed by Anne Davis 
Basting, Jack McGowin’s help is certainly suggestive of his wife’s need 
to be guided through the labyrinth. But it prevents us from perceiving 
McGowin’s disease-related lack of orientation within her narrative, as 
she instead offers a well-structured and accomplished account.16 Such 
an articulate presentation may well be aimed at convincing the reader 
of McGowin’s continued self-sufficiency, with her narrative matching 
traditional forms of illness representation.17
The journey metaphor typically comprises the patient leaving 
her familiar environment, departing to a realm that is unknown to 
her, that is the illness itself, and then returning from this journey 
enriched by the experience.18 It imagines the illness experience as one 
of change and otherness in relation to the normality of the healthy. 
Most importantly, this image traditionally implies that the patient will 
return from this journey (healed or in remission) feeling wiser, and will 
resume life accordingly. Therefore, the formulation of the illness experi-
ence as journey will only work partially for dementia patients, given 
that their medical condition precludes them from “coming back” from 
their illness experience. They are instead on a “journey of no return.”
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The journey metaphor works much better—if we remain in 
the area of conditions related to brain damage—for patients having 
undergone a stroke. It emphasizes the emotional stages of awareness 
during the patient’s slow progress of recovery, which brings her/him 
back to a new, though altered, state of normality. The title of Robert 
McCrum’s My Year Off: Rediscovering Life after a Stroke suggests such 
enrichment. The narrative embodies McCrum’s return, which the forty-
two-year-old journalist describes as follows: “The first year after illness 
struck was dominated by the struggle to become physically better. The 
second year . . . would be all about psychological well-being and the 
battle with the demons of despair and depression. But now, at least, 
I could begin to mix hope and optimism with sadness and gloom.”19 
However unlikely, the formulation of the journey myth works for 
dementia patients who describe themselves as wiser because of their 
illness experience. For example, they illustrate their insights gained 
in the confrontation with progressing degeneration, namely the deep 
understanding that they have to seize their lives now, while still aware 
of themselves and able to write. In this awareness they present narra-
tives that are as accomplished as their author-narrators would like to 
remain. In her chapter “Doing What I Can” in Just Love Me: My Life 
Turned Upside-Down by Alzheimer’s, for example, Jeanne Lee claims: “I 
certainly don’t consider myself a hero, but I do know that I get a great 
deal of satisfaction when I do even simple work for others, knowing 
it was done to the best of my ability” (42). Further on, in her chapter 
“Living in the Moment,” she contends: “The past is past, and because it 
no longer exists it is beyond our control to do anything about it . . . . 
Likewise, the future does not exist and so it also is not within our 
control and not worth giving any thought to. The only way to posi-
tively influence the future is by living this moment, right now, the best 
way we know how” (71). Lee openly admits that her book, which is, 
like McGowin’s, organized by themes rather than a temporal sequence, 
could only come to life with the help of a professional writer. But 
as she fulfills her ambition to achieve the publication of a personal 
narrative in her condition, the book becomes the surrogate of her 
continued agency: her text supports fellow sufferers, even after she 
is unable to articulate this support herself.
Where those who stay behind—that is caregivers and family—
use the metaphor of the journey, this image signifies very differently. 
Rather than presage the return of the narrator, it gives structure to 
caregivers’ (or others’) estrangement from the patient, particularly the 
fact that communication becomes so difficult. For example, during her 
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husband’s decline, Nancy Davis Reagan memorably stated: “Ronnie’s 
long journey has finally taken him to a distant place where I can no 
longer reach him,” conjuring an image of the two of them spatially 
separated by mental alienation and of the patient as being swept along. 
The fact that the former President has traveled and, at the time of 
the quote, continues to travel to a far-away place, deflects attention 
from the preconceptions attached to an Alzheimer’s patient, who is no 
longer in command of the nation or himself. Portraying him as on a 
journey avoids the need to spell out how pitiable is the distant place 
of regression the former President has reached. While terms such as 
“journey” and “distance” are neutral in themselves, they convey that 
Ronald Reagan is on the way somewhere far away from his wife 
and the American people. In suggesting both motion and change, the 
metaphor of the journey expresses Nancy Davis Reagan’s distance and 
separation from her husband and, in this way, allows her to withhold 
any detail about her husband’s cognitive, behavioral, and emotional 
state. This strategy achieves the dual aim of protecting Reagan’s dignity 
and avoiding confronting the American people with the spelt-out truth.
How strongly a narrator’s choice of metaphor is linked to her/
his outlook becomes clear from an analysis of Floyd Skloot’s A World 
of Light.20 The forty-two-year-old poet and essayist suffered a viral 
infection that left him, within months, cognitively impaired. However, 
as early as the narrative’s “Preface” he takes pains to distinguish his 
condition from his mother’s dementia: “Over the last half dozen years 
or so, as I have moved closer to integrating myself and my world, my 
mother has been disintegrating, losing her self and its connection with 
the world as she slips deeper into the chasm of Alzheimer’s disease” 
(xi). The narrative’s construction brings out Skloot’s understanding of 
the “light” in his situation and prospects. Its first part describes his 
mother’s state, opening with a scene in the nursing home and the 
insight that, “memory is doing what it is designed to do, ridding 
itself of inessential matter, uncluttering. But as age-related dementia 
sets in, such forgetting intensifies and worsens, eradicating even the 
most essential matter, until nothing is left” (7).
As if wanting to sharply contrast the implications of his cognitive 
impairment to the worsening incurred by Alzheimer’s disease, Skloot 
opens the second, central part of his narrative with the assertion that 
specific events “remain etched in my memory despite brain damage 
and long-term memory loss” (53). He offers vivid identity-defining 
memories from his past. The chapter eponymous to the narrative’s title 
is placed in the formal center of the text and fluidly moves between 
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past, present, and future, anticipating the return to the present in the 
narrative’s final part.
The story time significantly slows down as Skloot lingers on 
colorful images of his rich life for almost as long as on the introduc-
tion to the mother’s limited life. He emphasizes once more that his 
“mother’s mind is a meaningless dazzle of refractions and glimmers, 
winks of consciousness, cognitive chop,” continuing that “her mind 
can neither be still nor organize itself, and there is no let-up from 
the chaos. Nothing coheres; nothing is stable” (190). He, instead, is 
in “A Stable State” (179), and has the prospect of “heading in a new 
and promising direction” (187), as the light metaphorically illuminates 
his mind.
Cognitive States and Prospects: The Living Inanimate
The above quotations suggest that Skloot can write about the 
cognitive aspects of his condition in less negative terms because he does 
not perceive his cognitive impairment to be of a chronic degenerative 
type. In what follows, I will take a closer look at how Alzheimer’s 
patients understand their cognitive challenges to be inseparable from the 
condition’s chronic degenerative aspects. To confirm Skloot’s “lighted” 
view by contrast, Claude Couturier, in Puzzle: Journal d’une Alzheimer 
(Jigsaw: Diary of an Alzheimer’s patient), describes disappearing into 
a “trou noir” (black hole; 33) to illustrate the uncontrolled, inexo-
rable vanishing of her self and personality in mental, emotional, and 
physical terms. Blackness is identified with concepts of darkness and 
downward orientation; “sickness and death are down,” as Lakoff and 
Johnson explain.21 In the context of the memoir, Couturier’s “black 
hole” adds to the directional notion of her experience and links to the 
conceptualization of illness as a journey. As patients aim to remain in 
control in a situation of chronic degeneration, the question is then how 
they manage to depict, and continue depicting, the cognitive aspect 
of their predicament, as their loss of mental acuity will, eventually, 
deprive them of further control.
In Losing My Mind: An Intimate Look at Life with Alzheimer’s, 
the patient Thomas DeBaggio muses on the fact that he has “only 
a few years before I become a hatstand” and, further on, sees him-
self “rattl[ing] my cage but no one comes to feed me” (58, 185). He 
uses metaphors that strip him of his humanity and personhood and 
reduce him to an animal, if not an inanimate object. Such imagery 
suggests that patients perceive themselves as losing their agency and 
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dignity through the loss of mental acuity. This perception culminates 
in the patient’s fears of being “shovel[ed] . . . into the ashcan” (200) 
and considered, as McGowin words it, “human refuse, without merit, 
without feelings” (105).
These images do not leave much room for interpretations that 
would focus on the patient’s remaining abilities. At the same time, 
however, DeBaggio feels that he is “flooded with early memories 
preserved in protected places of my brain where Alzheimer’s does not 
reign supreme. These memories become the last remnants of my search 
for who I am” (42). In this awareness he preserves his memories in 
writing. His narrative becomes the grasping of his self—in the fear 
of ending in-animate, once he cannot remember and write any longer.
Couturier contemplates her loss of personhood, anticipated familial 
neglect, and undignified end of life in similar language: “ils vont bien 
finir par me jeter comme une vieille chaussette trouée” (they will surely 
come to throw me away like a sock full of holes; 97). She compares 
herself not only to an inanimate object here, but to one that is being 
trodden on. In further expanding on the object’s damaged nature, 
she includes the condition’s deleterious bearing on personhood as 
well as its impact on physical and psychological decline and related 
caregiver reactions. In particular, she is concerned about ending up in 
a vegetative state, an “existence . . . de légume” (vegetable existence), 
and would much rather “être incinérée” (be incinerated) under such 
circumstances.22 Continuing “je serai un légume grillé” (I will be a 
grilled vegetable; 71), she pokes fun at such in-animate discourse. That 
said, Couturier’s use of suspension points suggests her hesitance to 
enter into a discourse of dehumanizing symbolism. She confirms this 
assumption, when later claiming that “[l]a vie ne vaut d’être vécue 
que dans le partage, sinon on végète” (life is only worth living when 
shared, otherwise one vegetates], immediately adding in brackets “tiens, 
me voici à nouveau dans les légumes” (look, I am again with veg-
etables; 107), as if to draw attention to the harmfulness, but equally 
noteworthy the intuitiveness, of such imagery.
What I find most remarkable about Couturier’s writing is that she 
finds imagery that does turn attention to her remaining abilities, while 
equally pointing to the horror of the disease. She compares herself to 
objects that are frequently associated with life-affirming symbolism, 
shifting our attention from the notion of the object’s lifelessness to that 
of its hidden potential. For example, she has the impression “d’être 
un arbre en automne qui essaie désespérément de garder ses feuilles 
mortes, arrachées par un vent violent, et n’arrive plus à les remplacer 
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le printemps venu car ses racines ont été dénudées et ne peuvent plus 
se nourrir dans l’humus” (of being a tree in autumn, which desperately 
tries to keep its dead leaves that are being pulled off by violent wind, 
and no longer manages to replace them when spring comes, since its 
roots have been exposed and can no longer nourish themselves from 
the humus; 49). She transplants the tree, symbol of life and image of 
seasonal change, into the austere landscape of dementia, where the 
autumnal loss of leaves matches the patient’s perception of decline. 
The image conveys Couturier’s feeling of inescapable and increasing 
helplessness through the enforced passivity of the object (her self) 
and its exposure, including the leaves (her memories and qualities), 
to wind and weather (the illness).
Couturier’s choice of images reflects her will to portray contin-
ued capabilities, while concomitantly acknowledging the condition’s 
inescapable nature. The form and construction of her narrative follows 
the same principle. As G. Thomas Couser has observed regarding the 
form of the cancer patient’s diary, it necessarily manifests Couturier’s 
decline, with chapters becoming shorter over time as the reader moves 
forward in the story (just as the patient moves through her entries), 
fully aware that after one final date there will be no more entries 
witnessing the patient’s esprit and humor.23 Couturier’s metaphor mir-
rors the form of her narrative: as the tree loses its leaves, the entries 
in her diary become shorter. And in living this metaphor, she shows 
the agency she still has: as long as the tree is standing, she tells her 
story. The water keeping this tree alive is her continued ability to put 
pen to paper, her doctor’s encouragement to make the diary available 
in print, and the reader’s recognition of her achievements.
A second metaphor pictures feelings of loss no less memorably, 
when the artist compares herself to “une bougie en train de s’éteindre 
à cause du courant d’air montant des profondeurs de l’abîme qui se 
rapproche inexorablement” (a candle about to burn out due to the 
draught rising from the depth of an abyss that approaches inexorably; 
97). The candle (the person) consumes itself in shining (living); the 
light (the self), the very essence of the candle, is extinguished by the 
wind (the illness) without having any means to resist this process. 
While Couturier does not explicitly play on notions of the candle’s 
flickering, I think it noteworthy that this metaphor can also convey 
ideas of motion, revealing the patient’s feeling of being torn between 
the will to continue to be active and the perceived, cognitively enforced 
disappearance into passivity.24
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Passivity figures centrally in caregivers’ imagery describing patients’ 
profound cognitive impairment and substantial erosion of memory. In 
Keeper: Living with Nancy—A Journey into Alzheimer’s, Andrea Gillies, who 
looks after her mother-in-law Nancy, believes her relative to be “aware 
of the great buried store of memory, her past, her self, glimpsed under 
the tangles of Alzheimer’s like a ruined house under the suffocating 
grip of ivy” (19). The brain is the home of the patient and her self; it 
harbors all that defines the self: Nancy’s past and memories. While the 
“ruined house” image is the caregiver’s attempt to imagine the quality 
of a life with dementia, it also portrays the patient as passive and 
defenseless, unable to take measures against the house falling down, 
her memories and self being lost. In fact, Gillies’s narrative presents 
the story of her own grappling with caregiving rather than an attempt 
to record the parent’s story that would hold on to Nancy’s identity.25
Another powerful image describing the patient’s passivity is the 
“empty shell” metaphor. In expanding the notion of emptiness to 
the patient’s entire being, this image reveals how the caregiver un-
derstands the brain to be the core of the patient’s self. Its emptying 
becomes equivalent to losing that self.26 Caregivers’ frequent use of 
metaphors that compare experiences to physical, hence tangible, objects 
highlights how difficult they find it to describe mental phenomena or 
grasp emotional issues. As Lakoff and Johnson explain, “[o]nce we 
can identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to 
them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them—and, by this 
means, reason about them.”27 In picturing the mind as a machine, as 
an efficient and productive entity with an internal mechanism of its 
own, the caregiver conceives of the patient’s incoherence and silence 
as a mechanical failure rather than, for example, as related to the 
patient’s awareness of and upset about shrinking communication ca-
pabilities. In this context, Gillies imagines “the lights going out one 
by one” to simplify the far more complex reasons for and effects of 
her mother-in-law’s silence (74).
Caregiver imagery of houses and shells refers to the patient’s 
mind as the container of their memories and self. Its emptiness deprives 
patients of any further agency. This imagery is in stark contrast to 
how patients describe themselves: with images that convey animated-
ness and a still-rich memory. But although patients use imagery that 
conveys their continued agency, the question remains as to how they 
handle the fact that Alzheimer’s disease continues to be an untreat-
able condition, which eventually will deprive them of the agency 
they seek to maintain. The following section addresses this question; 
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it will show that dementia patients use imagery very similar to that 
used by patients with other (non-cognitive) conditions to describe the 
incurability of Alzheimer’s disease.
Admitting Surrender to the Incurable: An Unequal Battle  
and the Limits of Expression
In Skloot’s recording of his illness experience closer to the time 
of diagnosis, namely in a series of poems collected under the title 
“The Virus,” we read that he perceives of himself:
in a state
of siege, a protracted cold
war, I am occupied by an unseen
enemy. . . . I have lost control,
order is shattered, pockets
of resistance crushed one
by one. . . . 
I have seen myself
become a factory of disease
spewing internal acid rain,
then become the polluted
stream.28
According to Hawkins, the battle myth or war metaphor “serves 
to enhance the ill person’s sense of dignity, self-esteem, and active 
participation in therapy.”29 These images work well for Skloot, as 
he perceives himself as the victim of a “viral assault [having] eaten 
away parts of my brain, the resulting damage showing up as scattered 
punctate lesions in the cerebral cortex whose effects left me totally 
disabled” (ix). He can make out a well-defined virus as his enemy, 
and the image of the war becomes even more supportive for him as 
a victory, at least “a stable state,” becomes possible.
But can an Alzheimer’s patient use the metaphor of the battle 
to describe a condition that is degenerative and incurable? The most 
striking metaphor for the inexorable, destructive power of dementia 
in the words of a patient comes from DeBaggio, who refers to the 
disease process as “biological war” and “the holocaust of my brain” 
(169). These images allude to the remorseless dying of brain cells, 
express pain in the face of relentless loss, and convey the inescapable 
situation of the untreatably ill. Notably, Elaine Scarry classifies both 
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biological war and holocaust as torture, not as war or battle, expand-
ing on how experiences of this kind lie beyond the victim’s powers 
of verbalization—which further underlines the speechlessness to come 
for DeBaggio when dementia overtakes him.30
While the illness-as-war metaphor crops up a few times in 
DeBaggio’s memoir, he more frequently compares his diagnosis to a 
“death sentence” (e.g., 1, 37, 45), a verdict that leaves little room for 
waging battle. How strongly patients relate to the image of the death 
sentence—the absolute absence of a future—becomes clear from narra-
tives of other incurable illnesses, like HIV/AIDS prior to the develop-
ment of antiviral cocktails.31 In confirmation of the explanatory power 
of colors and in stark contrast to Skloot’s light, the title of Harold 
Brodkey’s This Wild Darkness: The Story of My Death emphasizes the 
patient’s awareness that “the sentence to such death” leaves little room 
for a positive outlook.32 Consequently, Brodkey does not—even though, 
like Skloot, he is infected by a virus—appropriate the image of war. 
However, what Brodkey does discover is, as Oliver Sacks writes 
about Anatole Broyard in the foreword to the latter’s essays relating to 
his terminal cancer: “a tremendous, unprecedented freedom in being ill, 
a freedom (perhaps for the first time in his life) to say exactly what 
he wants.”33 In fact, Brodkey states that “I have no shyness now,” 
and continues that he can, despite the awareness of the condition’s 
sexual stigma, “without hysterics describe the anal diddling that prob-
ably led to the transmission of this virus and to my death” (28). It is 
consequential that Brodkey chooses the form of a diary, making the 
narrative’s structure the true platform of his testimony: shorter and 
shorter entries separated by longer and longer intervals hide nothing 
of his wasting and nearing death.
Like Brodkey and Broyard, DeBaggio—who had given up his 
profession as a journalist for that of a herb grower—seizes his last 
chance, professing: “I was nearer to death than I anticipated. A few 
days later I realized good might come of this. After forty years of 
pussyfooting with words, I finally had a story of hell to tell” (1). In 
living up to this aim, he composes an illness narrative that skillfully 
illustrates mental deterioration, which suggests (I am echoing here 
Couser’s insights into HIV/AIDS life-writing) that he transformed his 
initial view of his diagnosis as “tantamount to a death sentence” to 
that of a life crisis, and thereby changed his outlook and quality of 
life.34 Yet the form of DeBaggio’s narrative does not actually trace his 
cognitive decline, even though, according to the “Author’s Note,” his 
book “is an attempt to show the parameters of long- and short-term 
84 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE METAPHORS
memory and how Alzheimer’s works to destroy the present and the past. 
To do this I set up three narrative lines” (xi). The narrative presents 
as a collage of page-long sections telling about DeBaggio’s childhood 
memories, italicized paragraphs of random aphoristic thoughts, and 
extracts from medico-scientific literature. While this construction may 
seem suggestive of an Alzheimer’s patient’s lacking mental coherence, 
we perceive it as strategically constructed. But this strategy can only 
partly work out, because we are aware of DeBaggio’s imminent cogni-
tive limitations. This is also true because the disease-imposed absence 
of happy closure contrasts with DeBaggio’s effort to offer a rounded 
and fully elaborated narrative. 
The tension between the trajectory of their disease and their 
will to portray themselves as continuously competent and productive 
explains why dementia patients are in urgent need of imaginative 
language as “explanatory models,” to be able to “communicate, and 
thereby symbolically control symptoms,” without necessarily following 
through with a comprehensive formulation of their images.35 With 
the death sentence image, for example, patients using the metaphor 
should not be expected to surrender to this verdict, although it very 
clearly describes their prognosis. The need for imaginative models 
is perhaps especially acute for patients facing dementia, given the 
condition’s current untreatability and its deleterious consequences 
for the patient’s self-understanding. In this respect I disagree with 
Susan Sontag, who claims “that the most truthful way of regarding 
illness—and the healthiest way of being ill—is one most purified of, 
most resistant to, metaphoric thinking.”36 But I follow her, as I will 
outline further below, when it comes to the use of metaphors that are 
of clear disservice to the patient.
Picturing themselves as being subjected to an anonymous verdict 
helps patients in their pursuit to keep as much agency and control 
as possible. After all, the threat is described as external, not internal, 
and the sentence is handed down to an as-yet-unchanged individual. 
Yet, as seen in their representations of the condition’s cognitive or 
chronic degenerative aspects, caregivers readily sacrifice their family 
members’ activity in their own illustrations of the untreatable nature 
of Alzheimer’s disease. They frequently personify the condition, as if 
they needed to be able to grasp and face the opponent more clearly. In 
Iris, John Bayley writes about the disease as “Dr. Alzheimer,” picturing 
him as the “Dark Lord.” In drawing an omnipotent god from whose 
powers his wife cannot possibly escape, he reinforces the impression 
of the reduced and insignificant patient. His metaphor highlights the 
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unequal match between patient and illness, and embraces—reminiscent 
of the journey metaphor—her departure to the realm of the dead. 
Similarly, Gillies imagines dementia as a sneaky robber and a “forest 
fire . . . [causing] havoc” to further her own understanding of her 
mother-in-law’s defenselessness (77).
This latter image comes closest to DeBaggio’s biological war 
and death sentence, suggesting that patient and caregiver perceive the 
burden of incurability in similar terms. I see this unison most clearly 
reflected in Ruth Schäubli-Meyer’s narrative Alzheimer: Wie will ich 
noch leben—wie sterben? (Alzheimer: How will I continue to live—how 
will I die?), a piece of collaborative writing between patient and care-
giver.37 The Swiss caregiver presents her husband as an independent 
personality. She offers fragments of his personal writing to illustrate 
the patient’s autonomous choice to “sterben, solange ich dich noch 
kenne” (die, while I still know you; 35), with the help of the Swiss 
organization Exit. Her narrative is symbol of the patient’s agency and 
a literal answer to his death sentence.
Schäubli-Meyer’s supposedly fictional narrative of “Anna and 
Gustav” reveals itself, on the last page, as the author’s “authentic ac-
count of her and her husband’s final years together, from the husband’s 
diagnosis to death.” The story’s problematic status—the caregiver’s 
searching for a suitable way to communicate the husband’s highly 
controversial decision (and her supporting it)—is already manifest in its 
form.38 The text’s simple language and continuous present tense suggest 
fictionality, while the frequently interspersed, paragraph-long quotations 
from the patient clearly claim the report’s authenticity. Schäubli-Meyer 
dedicates half of the originally published text to the documentation 
of their final year, and a third of this very section to their final day 
together, highlighting her husband’s decline by quoting him saying, 
“ich bin nicht mehr der, der ich war” (I am no longer the one who I 
was; 38). The patient’s metaphorical language expresses his pain over 
the fact that “Vergessen heisst, langsam zu Tode gequält werden” (For-
getting means being slowly tortured to death; 11). Gustav pictures the 
condition as a murderer, which, conversely, enhances our appreciation 
of his active decision to preempt forgetting. I do not mean that Gustav 
is able to halt this aspect of the disease process, but rather that he 
chooses to end his life before the disease has advanced to a stage in 
which he does not recognize himself anymore. Existence of the nar-
rative itself persists to remind people of him, and keeps readers from 
forgetting the sociopolitical discussion regarding assisted suicide. The 
narrative’s 2010 addendum emphasizes, not least in formally amount-
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ing to a third of the new edition’s total text, Schäubli-Meyer’s need 
to justify her husband’s decision. She adds further quotes from her 
husband; their selection remains the author’s domain, but in serving 
the final purpose of advocating the ethicality of assisted suicide, she 
follows her husband’s legacy. 
II. The Myth of Alzheimer’s: A Lens on Societal Fears
The Medico-Scientific Narrative: Dementia as the Synthesis of Illness,  
Aging, and Death
Schäubli-Meyer’s account portrays a patient who remains an 
active partner beyond the narrative time and frame, making a case 
against the Swiss government’s recent efforts to tighten laws regard-
ing assisted suicide.39 Both contents and construction of her narrative 
advocate the patient’s autonomy and agency, which strongly resonates 
with the messages individuals afflicted by Alzheimer’s disease convey 
in their narratives. The Swiss caregiver’s text deserves to be singled 
out further, as it gives voice and a platform to a patient and his cause 
against the usual assessment of passivity and emptiness.
In the context of the above elaborated tension between patient 
and caregiver discourse, and with the understanding that metaphors 
are not only a concept of thought but also action, I now turn to the 
source of the images patients write against, and which caregivers rely 
on so heavily. This analysis will lift the patient’s counter-discourse 
onto a much broader level—beyond that of “a voice in solitude” 
in disagreement with a caregiver’s assessment to an articulation in 
the process of sociopolitical opinion formation.40 I posit that patients 
choose their images of animated-ness in response to the metaphorical 
language from scientific and medical dementia discourses, on whose 
socially perceived authority caregiver presentations thrive. 
Gillies’s narrative, for example, seeks literal and figurative sup-
port from medico-scientific insights in the chapters that constantly 
interrupt her telling about living with Nancy. These chapters dwell 
on scientific facts regarding brain, mind, and memory. While the first 
of these chapters (chapter 4 in the narrative) eases the reader into an 
understanding of the brain, specifically its anatomy and biochemistry, 
the second such chapter (chapter 6) offers scientific and epidemiological 
data, quickly drawing the link between this condition and the loss of 
self. In particular, Gillies alleges that “[w]e don’t have brains; we are 
our brains” (74; original emphasis), continuing: “Lose the use of your 
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brain by degrees and the self is stripped away, layer by layer” (74). 
This assertion about Nancy’s loss is further highlighted by additional 
chapters (8, 10, and 12) that ponder Alzheimer’s original research pa-
per on the patient Auguste D., who had stated “I have lost myself” 
(106); the condition’s elusive pathogenesis; and the merely symptomatic 
treatment options. Against this bleak backdrop, Gillies believes that it 
“isn’t possible to have identity without a history” (150; chapter 16), 
corroborating her claims in the following chapters that consider the 
relationships between brain as well as mind and memory (18 and 20). 
The remaining twelve chapters are no longer interrupted by scientifically 
inspired deliberations: Gillies has her own story of loss of self to tell. 
It might seem surprising that patients similarly quote from this 
discourse. DeBaggio, for one, initially fills entire pages with quotes 
from scientific and medical literature spelling out Alzheimer’s patients’ 
decline, loss, and involution. In particular, he cites from the “Progress 
Report on Alzheimer’s Disease” by the National Institute on Aging, 
“The Johns Hopkins White Papers,” and his own “Neuropsychological 
Evaluation.” These quotations direct, as well as reflect, DeBaggio’s per-
ception of loss: “Alzheimer’s disease . . . results in memory loss, unusual 
behavior, personality changes, and a decline in thinking abilities. These 
losses are related to the death of brain cells and the breakdown of the 
connections between them” (6). When his citations from scientific and 
medical literature become less and less frequent, they are replaced first 
by material published by or for caregivers. Like the medical passages, 
these are similarly centered around aspects of loss, such as when a 
caregiver is cited by the Duke University Alzheimer Support Group as 
saying, “It is like losing a part of your history” (90). The home safety 
notes DeBaggio cites from the Alzheimer’s Disease Research Center also 
entirely rely on notions of loss: “Alzheimer’s patients . . . may expe-
rience confusion, loss of judgment, and difficulty finding words . . ., 
they may become more agitated or irritable, or very passive . . . and 
become lost . . . . They may suffer from loss that affects vision, smell, 
or taste” (112).
DeBaggio’s choice to progressively replace clinical statements 
with extracts from caregiver manuals underlines his perception that 
the caregiver discourse strongly relies on the medico-scientific repre-
sentation of the condition. But citations from either of these categories 
appear far less often in the second half of the narrative. DeBaggio’s 
story and rich memories end up filling that perceived “emptiness” and 
replace the initially prevailing scientific and caregiver-focused account. 
In some ways, DeBaggio offers several models for other Alzheimer’s 
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narratives: Gillies’s choice to turn from her mother-in-law’s to her own 
story emphasizes caregiver strain, while Schäubli-Meyer’s decision to 
place her husband’s words and will into the narrative’s center within 
and beyond his illness emphasizes patient autonomy.
Floyd Skloot’s references to medical and scientific literature are 
especially revealing, as he speaks as both patient and caregiver. Very 
early on he cites, in order to grasp his mother’s condition, the memory 
researcher Daniel Schacter: “[O]verall brain mass steadily shrinks. 
. . . Blood and oxygen flow to the brain diminishes; the frontal lobes 
shrink; the hippocampus, cornerstone in forming explicit memories and 
developing our sense of self, atrophies; the basal forebrain, implicated 
in most amnesias, loses neurons and lessens the production of essen-
tial memory chemicals” (6). But Skloot pushes the conceptualization 
of dementia as loss even further, because he stresses its connection to 
old age, stating (as quoted above) that “as age-related dementia sets 
in, such forgetting intensifies and worsens, eradicating even the most 
essential matter, until nothing is left” (7).
This discourse is, again, amplified by the biomedical concept 
of aging. Aging is associated with “an increasing probability for the 
individual to contract one of the degenerative diseases,” as a “pro-
gressive and irreversible” process, a “gradual decline.” The scientific 
discourse regards cognitive aging as biological senescence, describing 
changes in cognitive processes in older age in terms of failure, loss, 
inefficiency, and impaired performance.41 If society has increasingly 
come to see aging as a synonym for illness, then, Alzheimer’s comes 
to epitomize the sum of illness, aging, and dying. It has become a 
metaphor for fears of aging.42
Societal Predetermination: Myths about Alzheimer’s Disease
The conceptualization of dementia as loss belonging to old age is 
core to the patient’s counter-discourse. This centrality becomes clearest 
when we look at the demographic characteristics of those telling their 
story. All cited (and available) patient-authored texts are written by 
early-onset patients who have been diagnosed with the condition in 
the midst of their professional life, when the societal expectation of 
productivity sharpens their sense of loss and inadequacy and spurs their 
desire to make themselves heard. In addition, the early-onset patient’s 
awareness that the disease will prevent them from living the many 
years they biologically still “should” have further links the perception 
of Alzheimer’s to a condition of premature aging. Caregiver-authored 
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texts, by comparison, typically tell about late-onset Alzheimer’s patients: 
members of society who have already entered retirement age. These 
patients, as the caregiver’s presence suggests, have typically already 
reached a more advanced stage of their condition. The demographic 
as well as the clinical characteristics of these individuals match the 
very image of the patient against which early-onset sufferers assert 
themselves. 
I see the difference in presentations between patient and caregiver 
particularly rooted in the patient’s urgency to write against age-related 
stigma. Still, the number of patients voicing this view—or any view—is 
small. Some reasons for this phenomenon are certainly inherent to the 
condition, i.e., patients’ lack of time and energy to compose narrative 
in the light of an ailment that will soon prevent them from competent 
articulation—DeBaggio explicitly writes against his memory “crumbling 
into obscurity” (199), while Lee already had to rely on a collaborative 
writer to convert her “mumble-jumble . . . to paper in a manner that 
is readable” (ix). At the same time, patients might find themselves in 
the position to recount a narrative that is already written in the mind 
of society.43 Given that caregiver narratives far outnumber those written 
by patients, the caregiver version of the Alzheimer’s narrative easily 
reinforces the scientifically grounded, culturally dominant picture of 
the dementia patient’s passivity, dependence, and old age.
In fact, as Alzheimer’s has become synonymous with fears of aging, 
the disease has reached an everyday presence that strongly influences 
our response to this particular illness narrative. As a consequence, a 
narrator’s admission that she or he suffers from dementia overdeter-
mines the interpretation of the narrative that follows.44 To my mind, 
this predetermination also guides the reader’s interpretation of specific 
metaphors. Upon encountering the patient’s reductionist metaphors, 
the reader hunts for relevant properties of the source (the image be-
ing used) that apply to the presumed characteristics of the target (the 
patient using that image).45 For example, we might read Couturier’s 
candle image under the impression of chronic degeneration, picturing 
it as one being extinguished (and leading to darkness) rather than as 
a source of light and warmth. Likewise, we read Skloot’s narrative 
“in the light” of his own age. While Skloot may well be in “A Stable 
State,” it is in the nature of nervous system viral infections that they 
can lead to renewed infection and decline at any time. Yet decline is 
instead assigned to the nonagenarian mother’s Alzheimer’s disease by 
the narrator—and by the reader. As Rita Charon puts it, “the meaning 
of a narrative . . . arises from and is created by the meeting between 
teller and listener.”46
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The core fears society harbors in the confrontation with dementia 
are, eventually, laid bare in an analysis of contexts and situations where 
the term Alzheimer’s is used as a metaphor in its own right.47 Susan 
Sontag severely condemned the use of “metaphors to enliven charges 
that a society [is] corrupt or unjust.”48 Yet, in the light of the illness’s 
increasing daily presence, Alzheimer’s has not remained exempt from 
use as a metaphor to deliver a moral judgment against society or 
highlight historico-political atrocities. Three examples illustrate how the 
condition, having reached the peak of popular awareness during the 
last two decades of the twentieth century, has been appropriated by 
public figures as well as scholars to denounce forgetful conduct. That 
public figures use Alzheimer’s as a metaphor for misdeeds reinforces 
a vicious circle that will make it more and more difficult to lift the 
societally ingrained stigma around the condition. These examples further 
emphasize that society sees the core stigma attached to Alzheimer’s as 
centering on the patient’s dependence, inertia, and loss of self.
In 1994, shortly after Germany’s reunification, the historian 
Christian Maier employed the term “dementia transitoria” to describe 
the reunited country’s state “zwischen der Bonner und der Berliner 
Demokratie” (between the Bonn and Berlin democracies), referring to 
its need for a “Neugründung deutscher Demokratie” (new establish-
ment of German democracy) and re-awakening of German historical 
consciousness that would help to provide confidence in the light of 
changed roles and expectations within Europe.49 It remains question-
able why Maier employs the term dementia, instead of simply stating 
the facts and positively claiming the nation’s need to remember. His 
oxymoron suggests the condition’s reversibility, which painfully belittles 
the patient’s exposure to a chronic degenerative and incurable disease. 
It also ignores the fact that patients like DeBaggio continue to remem-
ber richly. When considering that patients have used the metaphor of 
a holocaust to capture the illness’s incurable nature, Meier’s reference 
seems acutely misplaced. He stigmatizes the illness by linking it to 
a concept of inertia that bears no relation to the patient’s activity in 
early stages of the disease.
The second example is that of Sonja Vukicevic, once Serbia’s most 
celebrated ballerina and during the Milosevic regime its most famous 
opposition artist. Vukicevic produced a highly critical theater trilogy, 
presented at the Institute for the Decontamination of Culture, in 1999. 
Entitled “Alzheimer,” the trilogy explores the reasons and motivations 
for the “collective dementia” that enables the compulsive repetition 
of political patterns throughout history.50 Using the disease to signify 
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a refusal to learn from historical events ascribes to the patient an 
unteachable or unpersuadable disposition, a concept that will become 
even clearer in the following example.
In his controversial biography that touches on the highly debated 
question as to whether his father, the German philologist and writer 
Walter Jens, had actually been a member of the national-socialist party 
NSDAP, the journalist Tilman Jens claims that the heated debate ema-
nating from this issue may have led to his father’s dementia. Walter 
Jens was diagnosed with vascular dementia one year after having been 
questioned about his potential NSDAP membership.51 Specifically, Jens 
brands his father’s claim not to have any recollection of such mem-
bership as “fatale Schweigekrankheit” (fatal illness of silence), going 
so far as to write that his father’s “Symptome politischer Demenz” 
(symptoms of political dementia) were conveniently timed as they com-
fortably excused the philosopher’s memory loss relating to the issue.52
Jens interprets dementia as a psychosomatic expression of mental 
distress. But scientific evidence that would justify this perspective con-
tinues to be patchy. Regardless, in the light of the condition’s chronic, 
degenerative, and incurable character, such an interpretation appears 
most unethical. As Sontag puts it, such “psychological theories of disease 
assign to the luckless ill the ultimate responsibility both for falling ill 
and for getting well.”53 In the light of the patient’s desperate search for 
an ascribable pathogenic cause that would allow for the use of much 
more enabling metaphors, if we think about Skloot’s image of war, 
Jens’s assertions must seriously upset patients. These examples show 
how the general idea of dementia as an illness of “only” memory loss 
prevails in the public opinion. In addition, such misuse of dementia 
or Alzheimer’s loads the condition with negative associations as to 
the patient’s unconstructive, even malevolent behavior, which will not 
enhance society’s positive attitude towards the ill and their need for 
empathetic accompaniment on their journey.
III. Alzheimer’s Disease Metaphors Illuminate the Fear  
of the Nearness to Death
That Alzheimer’s disease is exclusively used in the context of 
negative associations, human shortcomings, and failures makes this 
metaphor a sharp lens with which to focus on society’s underlying 
fears: of loss and of aging. These disease-related concepts are universally 
present and culturally sanctioned. But they hardly match what patients 
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set out to tell us, even though they themselves employ several of the 
stereotyped metaphors against which they write. Such ambivalence is 
a testament to the pervasiveness of this discourse and patients’ lack of 
alternative vocal models. Foremost, however, patients see themselves on 
a journey, and perceive themselves as being enriched by this journey. 
They breathe animated-ness into lifeless objects, and identify themselves 
as being alive even in the prospect of loss. They are aware of their 
bleak outlook—condensed and accelerated aging—and see themselves 
sentenced to a premature death. Yet they maintain their agency in 
telling their stories, asserting themselves as individuals in and beyond 
the ability to remember.54
Their narratives emphasize the potential in an aged human being 
that is accounted for in metaphorical expressions such as complete-
ness, fulfillment, and wisdom—and it is these characteristics that 
individuals with early-onset dementia fall back on, as Couturier does 
here: “Nous sommes avant tout des êtres humains, avec des qualités 
et des défauts, des hauts et des bas, et avec une maladie qui touche 
un organe de notre corps: le cerveau” (we are, above all, human 
beings with strengths and weaknesses, highs and lows, and with a 
disease that touches an organ of our body: the brain; 143). In insist-
ing on the physical nature of her condition, Couturier puts it on the 
same level with other terminal illnesses, thereby removing it from the 
preconception-loaded notion of an incapacitating cognitive disorder. Her 
move suggests that, for her, imminent cognitive impairment by itself 
is not the condition’s core threat. This insight is amplified when we 
read this passage alongside DeBaggio’s, Lee’s, or McGowin’s writings. 
Considering, for example, Brodkey’s emotional urgency in the face 
of terminal illness, or Skloot’s need to set his condition apart from 
the mother’s illness of old age, we come to understand that it is the 
patients’ awareness of their nearing death and dying that underlies 
most directly their selection of specific images and modes of presenta-
tion. The perceived core threat of Alzheimer’s disease is the death of 
the self and, relatedly, the fear of how people who are losing their 
selves will be treated.
Metaphors are a concept of action. This action is most apparent 
where caregivers, in the pain of losing a parent, do not concede the 
remaining control their patients so urgently need; where they instead 
emphasize the emptiness of the shell and the ruined house, quote 
from medico-scientific material, and offer their own story. The under-
lying idea that regards dementia patients as a senile, disengaged, or 
unproductive burden will not support a purposeful ethical discourse 
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about their aging and dying with dignity. The counter-discourse that 
is instigated by patients publicizing their life-writing is very much 
needed—on a societal, cultural, and individual level. In particular, 
the similarities seen between their metaphors and the metaphorical 
language used for terminal cancer or HIV/AIDS invite a reconsidera-
tion of the sociopolitical conceptualization of the disease. They remove 
from dementia the aura of cognitive failure, demanding metaphorical 
concepts that really offer, to speak with Broyard, “a relief from medi-
cal terminology.”
It is obvious that dementia pathographies cannot be truly repre-
sentative, in that patients can only articulate their decline while still 
in an early stage of the condition, and the metaphors they use “are 
created to express the feeling of subjective self, unitary, human, and 
unique.”55 All the same, these images come from individuals who 
wish to remain in control, who are not handing themselves over to 
the scientifically suggested and societally retained images of passivity, 
dependence, and emptiness. They mirror the patients’ illness perception, 
and faithfully illustrate their needs. And it is these images that must 
be read with a fresh perspective, free from the societal predetermina-
tion of memory decline as loss of self.56
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28. Skloot, Music Appreciation, 73–74.
29. Hawkins, 66.
30. Scarry, Body in Pain.
31. Couser, 81–92; Robbins, “Death Sentences.”
32. Brodkey, This Wild Darkness, 5; subsequent references incorporated in the text.
33. Broyard, xiv.
34. Couser, 82–84.
35. Kleinman, Illness Narratives, 48–49.
36. Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, 3.
37. Schäubli-Meyer, Alzheimer, originally published in 2008; all references 
incorporated in the text.
38. These considerations echo deliberations on Michael Ignatieff’s Scar Tis-
sue, where the supposedly anonymous narrator reports on the mother’s cognitive 
symptoms and inheritable condition; see Wiltshire, “Biography,” 419.
39. Britschgi, “Neue Vorschläge” (New suggestions).
40. Stanley, “Patient’s Voice.”
41. Davidson, “Metaphors,” 175.
42. O’Rourke, “Alzheimer’s Disease.”
43. These have been suggested as reasons for the small number of patient-
authored HIV/AIDS narratives; see Couser, 81–92.
44. For deliberations on the reader’s predetermination in relation to narratives 
of terminal illness, see Robbins, “Death Sentences.”
45. For an explanation of metaphor-related feature matching as developed by 
Amos Tversky and Andrew Ortony, see Hogan, Cognitive Science, 89–94.
46. Charon, Narrative Medicine, 52 (original emphasis).
47. See also Zeilig, “Dementia.”
48. Sontag, 73.
49. Meier, “Deutschland” (Germany).
95Martina Zimmermann
50. Crawshaw, “Play Reveals.”
51. Consider, for example, Aly, “Was wußte Walter Jens?” (What did Walter 
Jens know?) as compared to Spiegel, “Sprachlos” (Speechless).
52. Jens, Demenz (Dementia), 73, 87.
53. Sontag, 59.
54. Anne Davis Basting’s Forget Memory shows many ways in which patients 
can continue to live their identity beyond the ability to remember, inviting the 
caregiver’s and society’s acknowledgement of patients’ continued agency, and Jens 
Brockmeier elaborates on the concept of pre-narrative personal identity construction 
in “Questions of Meaning,” there also referring to Basting’s work.
55. Olney, Metaphors of Self, 34; for the non-representativeness of pathographies 
see, e.g., Couser, 170, 183, 227.
56. Linton, “Reassigning Meaning.” 
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